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MANAGEMENT VERSUS LEADERSHIP
AS REFLECTED IN SELECTED MILITARY JOURNALS (1970-1985)

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JOHN R. COMBS, MAJ, USA
B.A., Wake Forest University, 1972

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ABSTRACT

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MILITARY JOURNALS (1970 - 1985), by Major John R.
Combs, USA, 93 pages.

This thesis determined if selected military journals emphasized a traditional style of leadership in contrast to a managerial style of leadership during the period 1970 to 1985. A content analysis of five selected military journals was undertaken to determine if any trends in leadership philosophy were demonstrated during the period. The content analysis was performed on the the following journals: Parameters, Military Review, Infantry, A LOG (formerly Army Logistician), and Armed Forces Journal.

The results of the content analysis revealed that the advocacy of writers shifted from a high percentage of traditional leadership articles in the early portion of the analysis, 1970-1972, shifting toward an advocacy of managerial style of leadership in the 1973-1979 time period, and finally an ascendancy of traditional leadership articles during the latter portion of the study, 1980 to 1985.

The research postulated that the shift in advocacy from traditional to managerial leadership emphasis during the earlier period of the study was a result of both internal and external factors. A key factor was that managerial leadership models offered some rational hold over the ambiguity evidenced by more traditional leadership models.

The research indicated the ascendancy of traditional leadership advocacy beginning in 1981 and continuing to the end of the period studied. Once again, both internal and external factors influenced the shift of advocacy.

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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

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CHAPTER ONE

Leadership is one of the most observed, and least understood, phenomena on earth. (Burns, 1978, pg.2)

Statement of Purpose

The purpose of this research project was to determine the focus of articles on leadership style contained in selected military journals during the period from 1970 through 1985. The investigator conducted a content analysis of each leadership article contained within five selected military journals. The researcher performed a content analysis on the following journals published between 1 January 1970 and 31 December 1985: Parameters, Military Review, Infantry, A LOG (previously Army Logistician), and Armed Forces Journal. The researcher sought to determine if writers in the literature advocated a managerial style of leadership, a traditional style of leadership, or a balanced style of leadership.

Significance of the Study

A contemporary debate within, and outside of, the United States Army has focused on the propriety of the Army's use of the traditional leadership style as opposed to managerial

leadership style. Moskos (1974) argued that the military reflected societal changes that transpired in our nation. He described an "emergent" army for the 1980's. Moskos' "emergent" army is "neither completely subject to societal changes over which it has no control, nor is an autonomous entity operating independently of the forces affecting the larger society of which it is a part" (p.17). Moskos, like Janowitz (1959), cited new technological advances that significantly impacted on the military, particularly on the officer corps. The technological revolution required that the military gain proficiency in managerial and decision making skills in order to administer multimillion dollar weapons projects and large, complex organizations within the military establishment. Radway (1971) and Hart (1982) suggested that the service academies reflected civilian managerial trends by deviating from traditional military subjects toward liberal arts programs. Radway and Hart further indicated that traditional authoritarian approaches to discipline were reduced in the academies.

Larson (1974) characterized the military through two divergent models: "radical professionalism" and "pragmatic professionalism" (p.57). Larson utilized and updated the earlier writings of both Huntington and Janowitz to describe the Army of the 1980's. Larson contends that, according to Huntington (1957), society viewed the radical professional as the manager of violence. Huntington contended that the

professional officer corps manifested a high degree of three principal characteristics: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness (pp.11-18). The civilian community saw the military as a technically proficient and politically neutral warrior of the state (Vought & Binkley, 1978). The radical professional epitomized the application of the traditional (warrior) style of leadership.

Janowitz (1960) held the opinion that the pragmatic professional is a product of dynamic social transformations in which the traditional [warrior] role was replaced by a managerial technical role. Janowitz asserted that the army became a civilianized constabulary force. He believed that social change blurred the distinction between the civilian and the military (p.18). "As long as 'the battle is the pay off'...the fighter spirit is required to face combat," but the military profession "requires the incorporation of new roles, namely the 'military manager' and the 'military technologist'" (pp.21-22).

While writers in military professional journals conducted an academic debate on leadership versus management, military critics in the civilian press increasingly scrutinized the military. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, national forums and leading newspapers, including the Washington Post and New York Times, critics denounced the military for its failure to address the leadership

versus management issue. Record (1984) observed the following:

The result...has been a pernicious inability to distinguish between management and leadership, efficiency and effectiveness and technology and tactics--a confusion of bureaucratic (internal) imperatives and professional goals. Too many military men forgot why they were in uniform (p. D4).

Research Questions

The investigator elected to conduct a content analysis of selected military journals to determine if there were trends that indicated the Army had shifted its emphasis on leadership. If there was a shift in emphasis, the investigator sought to determine if that shift was: either from a traditional [warrior] style of leadership to a more managerial style of leadership or from a managerial style of leadership to a more traditional [warrior] style of leadership. The researcher addressed the following research questions.

1. What did the data indicate with respect to author advocacy of one form of leadership over the other?
2. What trends of military leadership advocacy could be identified in articles published in selected military journals during the period 1970 to 1985?
3. How could any change in leadership philosophy, as advocated in selected journals during the period of the investigation, be explained?

Definition of Terms

Background

A challenge for the investigator was to define the terms "traditional leadership" and "managerial leadership." Jacobs (1971), in concluding his analysis of leadership and exchange in formal organizations, stated that "perhaps the greatest weakness in the leadership literature has been a striking lack of precision in the use of the term 'leadership,' and probably even in what constitutes the concept" (p.338).

The term leadership evolved into many varied and discrete meanings. Burns (1978) discovered over 130 definitions of leadership (p.2). The United States Army Field Manual (FM 22-100), Military Leadership, sustained an evolution in the definition of military leadership. In earlier editions Military Leadership, (FM 22-100), defined leadership as, "the art of influencing and directing men in such a way as to obtain their willing obedience, confidence, respect, and loyal cooperation in order to accomplish the mission" (1961, p.3; 1965, p.3.). The current edition of the manual defined military leadership as "a process by which a soldier influences others to accomplish the mission" (FM 22-100, 1983, p.44). The manual states that military leadership must concentrate on beliefs and character, knowledge and skills, and implementation and

motivation. The leader applies these factors, known as the BE, KNOW, and DO of leadership, in the interaction with soldiers (FM 22-100, 1983, p. 44).

Burns (1978) believed that both the leader and follower defined leadership.

Leadership is the reciprocal process of mobilizing, by persons with certain motives and values, various economic, political, and other resources, in a context of competition and conflict, in order to realize goals independently or mutually held by both leaders and followers (p.425).

In addition, Burns further described leadership on a transactional or a transformational basis. Transactional leadership occurred when the objective of leadership was to aid the individual interests of persons or a group going their separate ways (p.425). Transformational leadership, in contrast, was a teaching form of leadership.

Transformational leadership ... [connotes] that whatever separate interest persons might hold, they are presently or potentially united in the pursuit of "higher" goals, the realization of which is tested by the achievement of significant change that represents the collective or pooled interests of leader and followers (p. 425).

Turcotte (1983) contended that leadership was "the energizing of human resources to move willingly and coherently toward organizational goals, despite the potential hardship of those goals" (pp. 46-47).

Leadership and management are neither synonymous nor interchangeable (Meyer, 1980, p.6). Meyer asserted that both

qualities are essential in this age of resource constrained budgeting. But, "managers can put the most modern and well-equipped force into the field. They cannot, however, manage an infantry unit through training or manage it up a hill into enemy fire to seize an objective "(p.6).

Management is the application of analytical processes and methods to facilitate the efficient and effective determination and utilization of resources. Turcotte (1983) suggested that management "might be reasonably regarded as the effective and efficient allocation of resources--human and material--toward desired goals"(p. 47). The Army Regulation (AR) 5-1, entitled, Army Management Philosophy, defined management as:

A systematic and interdisciplinary process to achieve optimum production through the effective and efficient allocation and use of resources. (Resources include: people, money, material, facilities, information and time) (1983, p. 1).

Definitions

Traditional (warrior) leadership.

The investigator defined traditional (warrior) style leadership articles as those that emphasized an interrelationship between the leader and the led. People, one of many resources of the manager, are the key resource of the traditional leader. At junior levels, battalion and below, face-to-face, "follow me," directed forms of leadership

manifest traditional leadership. At higher levels, traditional leadership is shown in an indirect manner. Leadership activities of the leader include teaching, guiding, and coaching subordinates. The subordinates respond by performing similar roles in leading their own subordinates. Writers of articles on traditional leadership advocated personal interaction between the leader and his followers.

Leadership is a subjective process whereby the leader exerts interpersonal influence on the soldier. The leader consistently demonstrates interpersonal influence by personal example and behavior. The leader's behavior impacts further on intangible factors, such as attitudes, beliefs and values of subordinate individuals and on performance of the organization as a whole. The traditional leader places emphasis both on the individual and the collective, or synergistic, effort of soldiers. The traditional leader pursues the mission, while at the same time caring for and developing the full potential of subordinates.

Managerial leadership

The researcher defined managerial style of leadership articles as those that stressed the efficiency and effectiveness of the process and output of the effort. In managerial leadership the manager places increased emphasis on the utilization of resources. Individuals are only one of many resources for the managerial leader. Resources

include people, material, money, time, information and facilities. Writers of managerial leadership articles emphasized controlling, directing, allocating, and integrating resources. The managerial leader allocates all available resources, with a priority or weighted value for each, as determined by the situation. Management, while subjective in its decision making process, is objective in its resource allocation process. The managerial leader focuses on the process of resource allocation; the process connotes a mode of rational, often statistical and/or quantitative, analysis. The managerial leader pursues the mission predicated on efficient and effective resource utilization.

Balanced leadership

The investigator defined balanced leadership style articles as those that stressed traditional leadership and managerial leadership as complementary manifestations of leadership. Writers of balanced leadership articles endeavored to achieve an equilibrium between the traditional and managerial leader. Hence, the balanced leadership leader pursues the mission utilizing resources efficiently and effectively, while simultaneously developing the full potential of people.

Neutral leadership

The investigator defined neutral leadership style articles as those that did not advocate a particular leadership style. Writers of these articles did not advocate traditional leadership, or managerial leadership, or balanced leadership. The writers merely indicated that different leadership styles existed.

CHAPTER TWO

We got so tied up in our techniques, devices and programs that we forgot about people. (Peters & Austin, 1985, p. xviii)

Survey of Literature

The purpose of Chapter Two is provide a historical and theoretical review of the literature regarding military leadership and management. The field of leadership produced many and varied views on the attributes and connotations of just what is leadership, what makes leaders and finally what in the result on the followers. The earlier studies provide the perspective and framework from which the more contemporary studies either build upon or contradict.

Historical Perspective

Jacobs (1971), in Leadership and Exchange in Formal Organizations, conducted the first major review and reinterpretation of the existing literature on leadership, power, and influence processes. Several developments facilitated his work. The first was the development of the social exchange theory that "addressed...basic attributes of the interaction that occurs between and among individuals, on the basis of which more complex interactions and institutions may possibly develop" (p. vii). The second was a 1969

review of literature that explained the influence process that constitutes leadership as a tool of the social exchange theory (p. vii).

In the early 1900s, Carlyle (cited in Jacobs, 1971) postulated the "great man theory." Carlyle believed that the progress of the world was made possible by the achievements of individuals [great men], who lived during the period in which the achievements occurred. Jacobs (1971) proposed an antithetical position, "cultural determinism," which countered that great achievements were derived not from great men, but from social forces existing during the period. The social forces reach such a magnitude that changes must occur, and the individual who can visualize those changes and inspire others to support them will be accorded leader status. Neither theory, the great man in a leadership position, nor the social influences which a leader reads correctly, can be demonstrated as scientifically "correct" (viii).

As a result of the popularity of the great man theory prior to World War II, there was a focus in the literature on leadership personality traits. The research endeavored to demonstrate a causal link between selected traits and leader behavior. Jacobs summarized 40 years of research into leadership traits in the following manner:

The research...failed to demonstrate unique leadership qualities that are invariant from situation to situation. A leader with certain traits may be effective in one situation and ineffective in another. Further, leaders may be effective in the same situation with different combinations of traits (p.17).

The remainder of Jacobs' work centered on the social exchange theory of leadership. In the social exchange theory, Jacobs (1971) stated that the leader, in order to be effective, must serve a functional utility in a group and make a significant contribution to the group and/or its goals. In exchange for the leader's contribution to the group, the group provides the individual the status and esteem of leadership.

Radical versus Pragmatic Professionalism

In the analysis of traditional leadership style and managerial leadership style, the researcher must contend with two leading, and divergent, models. These models were characterized by Larson (1974) as "radical professionalism" and "pragmatic professionalism" (p.57). He believed that Huntington's The Soldier and the State, was the "first important treatment of civil-military relations as a separate and distinct category of political phenomena, and its central themes have strongly influenced the thinking of scholars and the military" (p. 57).

In the radical professional theory, Huntington (1957) postulated a civil-military relations theory in terms of civilian control of the military. Civilian control of the military has as its overall goal the reduction of power of the military. The traditional civilian control over the military has been "subjective civilian control" (p. 80). This form of control maximizes civilian power at the expense of the power of the military. Maximizing civilian power always means maximizing power of a particular civilian group or groups. The military vacillates as civilian groups enhance their power positions within society. Because the military has little political power of its own, subjective civilian control achieved its end by "civilianizing" the military, and making it mirror the state (p. 83).

Huntington counters subjective civilian control with "objective civilian control" (p. 83). The essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of an autonomous military, evidencing a high degree of professionalism (p. 83). Huntington argues that military professionalism is manifested by three principal characteristics: expertise, corporateness, and responsibility. These characteristics represent the professional who pursues a "higher calling" in the service to society. Huntington uses as his central theme for expertise the Lasswell phrase "the management of violence" (p. 11). The military, having turned its energies inward

towards professional pursuits, was rendered politically sterile and neutral(p. 84).

Janowitz (1959) analyzed the military as a subsystem of society-at-large. He suggested ascendancy towards the characteristics of a large-scale, non-military bureaucracy. This ascendancy was a response to both the changing technology of war and to the transformational context in which the military operates in society (p. 23).

The technological growth in society narrowed the skill differential between the civilian and the military. The military professional is required to manage more sophisticated systems and organizations, like his civilian counterpart. Not only has the differential narrowed in the preparation of war, but also the weapons of mass destruction have "socialized danger" to the point of equalizing the risks between the soldier and the civilian (Janowitz, 1960, p.32).

Janowitz (1959) cited the increased role of deterrence as having a profound effect on the military mission. The military is forced to consider deterrence to a greater extent than in our past history. While deterrence does not relieve the military of its mission to fight effectively and immediately, it does force the military leadership to become more involved in the diplomatic and political ramifications of deterrence planning and execution

(p. 21).

Janowitz concluded that the military should be transformed into a "constabulary force" that could be used in situations where there is no clear distinction between war and peace or between military and political action (Larson, 1974, p. 61). The military of this constabulary force must be sensitized to the political and social consequences of military action (Janowitz, 1960, p. 424). As such, the political neutrality that Huntington advocated could not exist in the Janowitz model. The convergence of civilian and military roles described by Janowitz forces the traditional warrior of the past to become the military manager with strong civilian linkages to a large, bureaucratic, non-military organization. As Larson (1974) stated, the military has become "civilianized" (p. 62).

Both of the models outlined above represent divergent institutional roles for the military. The Huntington model represents the pure warrior, manager of violence, with little concern for the political and social ramifications of his actions. The Janowitz model represents the military manager who is converging with his civilian counterpart so completely as to obscure traditional lines of distinction between civilian and military. Janowitz (1960) believed that the history of the modern military could be described as "a struggle between 'heroic' leaders, who embody traditionalism and glory, and military 'managers' who are concerned with

the scientific and rational conduct of war" (p.21).

Pluralistic Professionalism

As an alternative to both Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960), Moskos (1974) and Bradford and Brown (1973) proposed a "pluralistic" model for the military. Moskos and Bradford and Brown suggest that both the convergent and divergent aspects of the military will evidence themselves in the future. The non-homogenous Army will possess certain factions that accept the convergent role and other factions that accept the divergent roles. The "pluralistic model" simultaneously displays organizational trends that are civilianized and traditional. The traditional or divergent features will be displayed in the combat arms of the Army, while the civilianized or convergent features will be exhibited in the combat service support branches. Moskos cited a long standing tradition for the latter in the Corps of Engineers (p. 29).

The obvious disadvantages of "pure" Huntington or Janowitz models are alleviated in the pluralistic model. The "pure" convergent Army, conferring more individual rights to its soldiers and less authoritarian control, while viewing the military as an occupation rather than a calling, would quickly lose its viability as a military organization. The "pure" divergent Army could develop anti-civilian

values, and experience difficulty in either maintaining the organization at its required complexity or attracting the quality members requisite for effective performance (p.30). Bradford and Brown (1973) defined the military profession in a pluralistic sense by identifying both its purpose and conditions placed upon the fulfillment of that purpose. They described the "unlimited liability clause" that will always separate the military from any other profession. "While many people outside the [military] profession may have a self-imposed commitment to unconditional service to the state, but only the military possesses the obligation collectively as a defining characteristic" (p.222).

Contemporary

In his book, Leadership, Burns (1978) stated that "the crisis of leadership today is the mediocrity or irresponsibility of so many of the men and women in power...we know far too much about our leaders,...[and] far too little about leadership" (p. 1). Burns described two basic forms of leadership: the transactional and the transformational (p.4). He contended that in the transactional leadership style, the goal is not the group conducting a joint effort with common aims, "but a bargain to aid the individual interests of persons or groups going their own way" (p. 425). Transformational leadership extends beyond the individual interests of the group to the pursuit of higher

goals, "the realization of which is tested by the achievement of significant change that represents the collective or pooled interests of leaders and followers" (pp.425-426).

Zaleznik (1983) asked the question if leaders and managers have distinctly different personalities (p.32). He believed that managers have goals that are embedded in the organizational structure, while leaders actively attempt to shape public ideas and taste (p.33). Managers use methods with the following characteristics: avoiding direct confrontation, trying to select ways to convert win-lose situations into win-win situations, and forcing subordinates' attention on procedures rather than the substance of the decisions. In summary, managers create a climate of "bureaucratic intrigue and control, which may account for subordinates' often viewing managers as inscrutable, detached and manipulative" (p. 33). Zaleznik asserted that the leader was more interested in what events and decisions mean to subordinates than his role in getting things accomplished. Managers who assume that effective management is enough make four incorrect assumptions. First, that the goals of the organization are inherently sound. Second, that developing structures and forms to solve problems involve no cost to the organization. Third, that motivations, beliefs, needs, and desires of human beings are constants and will automatically support the structures that managers try to implement. Finally, the weakest assumption is that behavior is

predictable (p. 34). Zaleznik linked his definition of a leader with that of Burns' transformational leadership, and that of a manager with Burns' transactional leadership (p.34).

Peters and Austin (1985), indicated that a "back to basics" revolution is developing in corporate America.

The management systems, schemes, devices and structures promoted during the last quarter century have added up to distractions from the main idea...the basics got lost in a blur of well-meaning gibberish that took us further and further from excellent performance in any sphere. We got so tied up in our own techniques, devices and programs that we forgot about people (p. xviii).

Peters and Austin (1985) believed that successful corporations encompass the following characteristics: care of customers, constant innovation, and "turned on people" within the organization. The one element that unifies these characteristics is leadership: "vision, cheerleading, enthusiasm, love, trust, verve, passion, obsession, consistency, creating heroes at all levels...coaching" (p.6).

Zoll (1983) cited two causes for the crisis of self-image within the military. The first is the confusion within the military profession regarding social and ethical responsibilities. The second involves the military professional's belief that society is in trouble. Connected with the latter attitude is the conviction that the

military's moral and historical conventions are superior to the flux and turmoil pervading the country (p.28). Many officers, however, have chosen "to pursue a professional life that was in many respects similar to the upward progress of a corporate executive and with about the same moral and social convictions and conventions" (p. 28). Zoll challenged the military to demonstrate leadership, "not the political style" but one that "evokes a clear-cut military image, leadership that does not equivocate and that bears all the signs of solid performance" (p. 31).

Marshal (1978) believed that war is always an equation of men and machines. Efficiency is derived from the proper balancing of that equation (p.204). He warned of the danger of "falling in love" with the idea that success can be reduced to a purely mathematical problem of counting men and machines and the support required to supply them.

If I learned nothing else from the war, it taught me the falseness of the belief that wealth, material resources, and industrial genius are the real sources of a nation's military power. These things are but the stage setting; those who manage them are but the stage crew. The play's the thing. Finally, every action large or small is decided by what happens up there on the line where men take the final chance of life and death (p.208).

Gabriel and Savage (1978) in Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army, cited the impact of both Viet Nam and the McNamara era on the officer corps. The latter was evidenced in the manner in which the Army moved closer to

the business corporation in "concept, tone, language, and style. The individual military officer became identified with the corporate executive to the point where the functions of command were perceived as identical to functions of departmental management" (p.19). They suggest that the "officer corps had actually come to believe that leadership and management were one and the same thing and that a mastery of techniques of the latter would suffice to meet the challenges of the former" (p. 20).

Field Manual 22-100 (Military Leadership)

The United States Army's philosophy on military leadership has been expressed in Field Manual 22-100, titled Military Leadership. The manual traced its beginnings to Training Circular 6, dated 19 July, 1948 and Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 22-1, dated December 1948. An interesting aspect of the research was in tracing the changes in the definition of leadership throughout the various editions of the manual. The first field manual titled Leadership, was FM 22-10, dated March 1951. The manual, with change 2, defined leadership as:

The art of influencing human behavior--the ability to handle men. The techniques will vary depending on the size of the command, the types of men, the personality of the commander, and the particular situation (p. 1).

The next Field Manual received both a new numerical designation, 22-100, and a new title, Command and Leadership

for the Small Unit Leader. The leadership definition contained in this Korean War vintage manual, dated February, 1953, was:

The military leader must build up a command relationship between himself and his men that will result in immediate and effective action on their part to carry out his will in any situation. In the process of building such a command relationship, the successful military leader will obtain the obedience, confidence, respect and loyalty of his subordinates (p.2).

The December 1958 version of the leadership manual was titled, FM 22-100 Military Leadership. This manual carried the definition of leadership which would remain unchanged for fifteen years:

The art of influencing and directing men in such a way as to obtain their willing obedience, confidence, respect, and loyal cooperation, in order to accomplish the mission (p.7).

Both the June 1961 and the November 1965 versions of FM 22-100 carried the same operational definition of leadership as seen above. It is important to note that the definition of "management" made its first appearance in the 1961 version of the manual. Management was operationalized as:

a. The process whereby the resources of men, money, material, time, and facilities are utilized to accomplish the missions and tasks of the organization.

b. The functions of management are: planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling.

c. The functions of the manager are: establishing objectives, motivating, communicating, innovating, maintaining cooperation, developing subordinates, and making decisions (p. 4).

The 1965 manual expanded the 1961 management definition to include paragraph d.

d. Although attempts are made to differentiate between good "management" and good "leadership," the objectives of both are identical. In the main, the roles of "manager" and the "leader" are inseparable (p. 3).

The June 1973 version of Military Leadership made the first radical departure from past leadership manuals. Leadership and management were made co-equal, under the "umbrella" of command. The management definition did not significantly change.

The process of planning, organizing, coordinating, directing, and controlling resources such as men, material, time, and money to accomplish the organizational mission (p. 1-3).

In an elaboration of the definition of management, it was stated that the manager used the process of leadership to control this critical resource [men]. The above description implied that leadership is a subset of management (p. 1-3). The leadership definition was changed to read:

The process of influencing men in such a manner as to accomplish the mission (p. 1-3).

Finally, the latest Military Leadership manual, dated October 1983, defines leadership as " a process by which a soldier influences others to accomplish the mission (p. 44). This version of the manual did not mention management or manager in describing leadership. It did describe leadership as applying the attributes --beliefs, values, ethics, character, knowledge, and skills--of leadership (p. 44).

Military Studies

During the period 1970 to 1985, the military in general, and the U.S. Army in particular, undertook a series of self-directed studies concerning leadership and professionalism. The first two of these studies were conducted in 1970, when the military was reeling from the conflict in Viet Nam, from a moral and ethical crisis within, and from increasing pressure without from a hostile civilian populace.

The Study on Military Professionalism (SMP) (1970), was conducted by the U.S. Army War College, by direction of the Army Chief of Staff, General Westmoreland (1970). In his implementing directive, General Westmoreland cited "the need for a through review of certain areas and practices [discipline, integrity, morality, ethics, and professionalism] within the Army, and an analysis may

indicate prompt corrective actions may be necessary" (p.1).

Among the findings was the significant difference between the idealized professional climate and the existing one (SMP, 1970, p.13). The former was epitomized by the words Duty - Honor - Country. The latter included overtones of:

Selfish behavior that places personal success ahead of the good of the service....preoccupation with the attainment of trivial short-term objectives even through dishonest practices...overemphasis on zero defectsthe value of a high OER [Officer Efficiency Report] over the welfare of their men (SMP, 1970, pp.13-17).

Among the conclusions was that the Army "rewards system focuses on the accomplishment of short term, measurable, and often trivial tasks, and neglects the development of those ethical standards which are essential to a healthy profession" (SMP, 1970, p. 31). The first specific recommendation of the study was to "disseminate to the Officer Corps the pertinent findings of the this study..."(p.38). It was interesting to note, with the emphasis the study placed on integrity and honesty, that the study and its results were considered "close hold" by the Chief of Staff for over a year.

The second study conducted was Leadership for the 1970's (SL70) (1971) by the U.S. Army War College, by direction of General Westmoreland. The purpose of the study was to determine "the type of leadership that would be

appropriate as the Army approached the zero-draft conditions of the Modern Volunteer Army" (p. v). The study design was built upon two principal concepts: "the 'informal contract' and the 'leadership climate'" (p. 3). The informal contract addressed the relationship between the organization and the individual, the expectations of both parties, and requirements for a satisfactory relationship between the two (p. 3). The summary conclusion stated that:

Like it or not, the Army's lifeblood and continued existence are directly dependent upon the youth of this nation--a youth whose education level is increasing rapidly; a youth driven not by the physical needs of a bygone era, but rather by the quest of fulfillments of human values. The task for Army leadership...is to insure that, in all his interactions and relationships with the Army, the professional soldier...will view his relationship...as one which is supportive and which builds and maintains his sense of personal worth and importance (p. 62)

The Review of Education and Training for Officers (1978), (RETO), was directed by the Army Chief of Staff, General Rogers, to propose a system "satisfying those requirements...for complete career education and training needs to accomplish the Army missions" (p.1). The study examined the educational and training needs for the Officer Corps to "think and decide" (p.III-3). Of significance was the concern that training and educating the officer corps called for a system quite different than that of any other profession. The officer must balance the dichotomy of being educated in the liberal tradition, which values freedom,

individuality, and skepticism, yet also being trained to act in conformity with others in selfless service to the Nation (p.III-3).

The Officer Personnel Management System Study Group (OPMS) (1984) was directed by the Chief of Staff, General Wickham, to determine if the officer personnel management system meets the needs of the Army of the future. The OPMS Study Group sought to refine the management of officer assignments to produce longer more meaningful careers and to manage, develop, and promote officers by branch and/or functional area (OPMS, 1984, p.19) One interesting aspect of the OPMS study was that it requested the United States Military Academy History Department to study successful combat leadership to identify the trends and characteristics that should be institutionalized in the development of officers (p.27). The five critical factors identified by the USMA history department, which were present in every case--and defeat usually ensued in their absence--were:

- terrain sense
- single-minded tenacity
- ferocious audacity
- physical confidence
- practical practiced judgement

The final study to be discussed is the Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS) (1985). PDOS was directed by the Chief of Staff, General Wickham, to:

Evaluate the commissioned officer professional development system in light of the Army's needs during the period 1985-2025; to focus on professional military training and education...to ensure that our...system and philosophy will provide the professional development of officers and the leadership need for the future (p. 2).

PDOS developed a series of fundamental principles that became the benchmark in the design and measurement of the Army officer professional development system. The key principle was that:

Officers develop a vision of the nature of future warfare, expect it and personally prepare themselves and their subordinates to fight and win on the battlefield. In the final analysis, it is the requirement to meet the demands of combat that defines the value of the officer corps (p.7).

PDOS suggested that the underlying foundation of this development process was that all officers: are professional, have a "warrior spirit," progressively master the art and science of warfare, are leaders, are action-oriented, and develop a broad base of general knowledge (p. 7-9).

CHAPTER THREE

When we can't measure the things that are important, we ascribe importance to the things we can measure (Wakin, 1984, p. 58).

Methodology

The investigator conducted a content analysis of military leadership literature to ascertain if the writers' orientation focused primarily on management skills or traditional military warrior leadership skills. The purpose of Chapter Three is to outline the research methodology employed for collecting, analyzing and interpreting data derived from the content analysis.

Journal Selection

The first step in the methodology was to select the journals for review in the content analysis. Although all the services had to deal with the "leadership versus management" issue, the analysis focused primarily on the United States Army. Therefore, with one exception, the selected military journals pertained to the Army. The single journal included in the analysis that did not primarily have an Army focus is the Armed Forces Journal. This civilian journal had previously focused on the Army and the Navy, but subsequently shifted its scope to the entire Armed Forces.

Time Period

The period from 1 January 1970 to 31 December 1985 was selected as the time frame for the study. This time frame was selected for the following reasons. First, the journals within the period indicated were readily available in the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL). Secondly, the significance of the beginning date, 1 January 1970, is that during 1970 the Army Chief of Staff, General Westmoreland, directed the Army War College to conduct two major studies. The War College investigated Leadership for the 1970's to "study the validity of the Army's concept of leadership for the years ahead" (1971, p.1). The War College also conducted a Study on Military Professionalism, to address "the need for a thorough review of certain areas and practices [discipline, integrity, morality, ethics, and professionalism] within the Army, and an analysis may indicate [that] prompt corrective actions may be necessary" (p. 1). Both of the studies performed by the War College suggested that the senior Army leadership was concerned with professionalism and leadership issues in 1970. Additionally, heightened public discontent with the Viet Nam conflict, and the real (or perceived) breakdown in discipline and leadership within the armed forces, caused consternation both within the services and in the civilian sector. The third reason for the selected time frame is that the ending date, 31 December 1985, provided a current data

for the study.

Material Included and Excluded

In each of the journals selected only feature articles were reviewed for the content analysis. Therefore, to minimize bias and for consistency the content analysis excluded editorials, letters to the editor, and short news items. Further excluded were historical articles that described leadership, unless the writer used an historical example to make a point regarding contemporary leadership problems.

Categories

The next step in the methodology was to define the content analysis categories. The four categories selected comprised of articles advocating one of the following: a traditional (warrior) style of leadership; a managerial style of leadership; a balanced (traditional and managerial) style of leadership; or a neutral (advocating neither traditional nor managerial) style of leadership.

Unit of Analysis

In addition to defining the categories into which the content data were to be classified, the methodology designated the units to be coded. Initially the choice was that of recording unit, the specific segment of content

that is characterized by placing it in a given category (Holsti, 1969). The recording unit for the research was the entire article or item. Therefore, upon analysis, each article was placed into one of the four categories mentioned earlier.

Many of the articles analyzed clearly fell into one of the four described categories. A review of the topic and highlights of the article enabled the placement of the article into the defined categories. Some articles did not fall cleanly into any category, and had to be further coded.

The methodology further coded articles that did not fit into a described category without further analysis by utilizing context units. In those articles, the paragraphs of the article were analyzed to ascertain: first, if a leadership theme existed within the paragraph, and second, if a leadership theme existed, what category best characterized that theme. The themes were same four leadership categories described earlier in the methodology. Even employing context units, the analysis indicated the direction of the bias or advocacy, not the extent of advocacy within the article (Holsti, 1969). Holsti cautioned that the methodology that relies on frequency of content or context units has two pitfalls. The first was the belief that the frequency of appearance was a valid indicator of concern. Secondly, was the assumption that each unit of context should be given the same weight (p.122). Cognizant of these

pitfalls, the methodology employed for coding articles that did not fall cleanly into a defined category was as follows.

Each paragraph was analyzed to determine its leadership theme. Many articles utilized negative examples of one category of leadership as well as positive examples. In those cases, the relative "pluses" and "minuses" were algebraically summed for a total. Next the conclusion of the article was analyzed to determine the closing theme of the article. If the overall theme summation was greater than 60% in favor of a category and the conclusion was in agreement with the context count, the article was placed into that category. Those articles that fell below the 60% level and that the concluding theme was not in advocacy of one category over another, were categorized as balanced leadership. The subjective decision made by the methodology was when the overall theme count was in favor of one category and the summation was in favor of another. In this example the methodology favored the conclusion over the theme count.

Enumeration

Each volume of the journals selected was analyzed. First, a count of the total number of articles contained within each volume was conducted. Second, a review of the table of contents in each of the selected journals was

completed to elicit an overview of articles published within the journal. However, a scan of the table of contents was insufficient to detect applicable articles. Titles could have little or no bearing on the subject of the article as noted in, "The Jazz Musician and the Algonquin Indians" (Malone and McGee, 1984, p.52). The article stressed organizational leadership, but without reviewing the article, there was no indication of the writers' theme.

The methodology utilized the definitions in Chapter One in analyzing each leadership article. Bradley's article, "Leadership," in the 1972 Parameters, is an example of the application of the traditional leadership definition. Bradley asserted that "while we use computers for certain answers, let us not try to fight a whole war or even a single battle without giving proper consideration to the element of leadership" (p. 2). Bradley continued by stating "that the test of a leader lies in the reaction and response of his followers" (p. 3). He contended that men are not machines, and therefore it is not enough to get maximum effort from them without gaining their loyalty. Bradley provided an example from Guadalcanal about junior leadership. The point of the example was that good leaders were being killed and poor leaders caused men to be killed. This analysis does not suggest that Bradley believed that traditional leadership necessitated that leaders die during a conflict, but that interpersonal leadership requires that

the leader share the same risks of subordinates and therefore lead by example. Thus Bradley was a writer who advocated traditional leadership within the Army.

A number articles were reviewed in which the authors cited an increased emphasis on the managing of soldiers as opposed to leading. Vought and Binkley (1978) cited a "new professionalism [that] has absorbed the managerial ethos" (p. 29). The writers believed that the profession of arms is unique to society, and addressing the ethics of the military profession in the context of a civilian industry "encourages bureaucratic behavior" (p. 29). Vought and Binkley suggested that since the Army has no profit motive as a gauge for efficiency, the Army risks having its management techniques become ends in themselves (p.30). Vought and Binkley contended that the military must shift toward a more traditional form of leadership and isolate itself from the surrounding society. This article was categorized as traditional leadership.

The analysis of managerial leadership literature revealed few writers who addressed leadership at the junior level (battalion level or below) emphasized managerial leadership over traditional leadership. At the higher levels of the military (brigade and above) there was more evidence of managerial emphasis. Hillman (1971) stressed the management system within the military leadership

context.

Although the term "management system" evokes thoughts of business, logistics, administration, and automatic data processing (ADP), it has a broader meaning; it even comprises the means and methods used by an infantry battalion to "seize and hold Hill 291" (p. 43).

Hillman argued that the military is a "management system" with the following structure: intermediate objectives, resources, organization, procedures, and policies. Hillman contended that the system is structured to realize an assigned goal or objective (p. 44). This article was categorized as managerial leadership.

Authors whose articles acknowledged the need for both the traditional and managerial leadership skills were categorized to the balanced leadership category. Leader (1984) asserted that industry is willing to accept "oneness of managerial and leadership skills" (p. 94). While the services believed that "leadership" assumed a mystical significance, Leader suggested that study of the great military leaders would reveal the "range of their talents and support the synonymy of leadership skill and managerial ability" (p. 94). He proposed that a solution both for the dichotomy between leadership and management, and for the identification and promotion of leader-managers with unusual potential for advancement, could be illustrated in the German General Staff system. "The German General Staff system proved since the 19th century capable of consistently

producing leader-managers of the first rank" (p. 94). Leader's article was assigned to the balanced leadership category.

The neutral leadership category included those articles in which the authors did not argue for a particular style of leadership. Csoka (1985) contended that the study of leadership is fundamental to developing as a leader. He suggested that leadership is both an art and a science: knowledge as a science and practice as an art. Csoka concluded that only through the study of leadership can individuals enhance their application of leadership. Csoka's article was categorized as neutral leadership.

CHAPTER FOUR

Managers are necessary; leaders are essential (Slim, 1957, p.7).

Data and Trends

The purpose of chapter four is to present the data and identify trends produced by the content analysis methodology. Chapter Four will discuss the following aspects of each journal reviewed: the mission of the journal, background information describing the journal, and findings and conclusions of the content analysis. The research addressed the following research questions:

1. What did the data indicate with respect to author advocacy of one form of leadership over another?
2. What trends in military leadership advocacy could be identified in articles published in selected military journals during the period 1970 to 1985?

The Journals

Parameters

Parameters is the journal of the United States Army War College, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Initially established in 1971, the journal was published in 1971 and 1972 triannually. For the next four years, from 1973 through

1976, Parameters was published biannually. It evolved into its current format in 1977, and is published quarterly. In 1973 (Volume III) and in 1976 (Volume VI) there was only one issue published, which distorted the compiled data. Parameters maintains an average quarterly circulation of 8,500. It provides a forum for the expression of mature, professional thought on matters of broad military strategy, national defense policy, top military management, and other subjects of significant and current military interest (Parameters, 1971, p. i).

Military Review

Military Review is the journal of the United States Army Command and General Staff College, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Established in 1922, it is published monthly. Military Review has an average monthly circulation of 27,000. It serves as a forum for professional military thought that is aimed primarily at general officers and field grade officers (major through colonel). Chief contributors are Army officers who write on topics of current interest, such as tactical issues, logistics, and national and international security interests. Although most articles are contemporary in nature, some have a historical focus (Katz, 1982, p.672).

Infantry

Infantry is the journal of the United States Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. Established in 1921 as the Infantry School Mailing List, it evolved into the Infantry School Quarterly in January, 1959. Infantry began bimonthly publication with the October-November, 1959 issue. It has an average circulation of 19,000. Infantry communicates current doctrinal information on infantry organization, weapons, equipment, tactics, and techniques. It serves as a forum for discussion of progressive military thought. It is directed primarily toward infantry officers and non-commissioned officers (Katz, 1982, p. 671).

A LOG

A LOG is the journal of the United States Army Logistics Management Center, which is under the sponsorship of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and the Commanding General, the United States Army Material Command. It is published by the United States Army Logistics Management Center, Fort Lee, Virginia. Established in 1969, the journal was published under the title of Army Logistician until 1984. A LOG is published bimonthly and has an average circulation of 75,000. A LOG provides authoritative and timely information on Army and defense logistical plans, policies, doctrine, procedures, operations, and development. It is applicable to the Active Army, the National Guard, the

Army Reserve, civilian employees of the Army, and to the public. The journal is published to increase soldiers' and civilians' knowledge and understanding of logistics, and to assist in accomplishing information objectives of the Department of the Army (A LOG, 1970, p. i).

Armed Forces Journal

Armed Forces Journal is a civilian journal published by Army and Navy Journal Inc., Washington, D.C. Established in 1863 as the Army and Navy Journal, it was published weekly until 3 August, 1970. From 3 August, 1970 until August, 1971, it was published biweekly and, subsequently, published monthly. The Armed Forces Journal has an average circulation of 23,000. Armed Forces Journal serves as an international and defense spokesman for the Armed Forces. The articles are contemporary and analytical in assessment of current doctrine, strategy, equipment, and congressional impact on the defense establishment. While objective in reporting, the journal has postured itself as a defense establishment watchdog (Katz, 1982, p.670).

None of the journals above are official publications of the Department of Defense or of the Department of the Army. Therefore, the journals carry the caveat that the views contained within are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or of the Department of the Army.

The Data

Military Review

Table 1 displays the data from the content analysis of Military Review. There were 1579 articles published within the journal during the period of analysis, of which 8.2% were articles that dealt with leadership. Of the leadership articles, 67.7% were categorized as traditional leadership, and 13.1% as managerial in orientation. The remainder of the articles were either balanced (15.4%) or neutral (3.8%) in leadership focus.

Figure 1 portrays the results of the content analysis for leadership articles from Military Review. In the analysis of Military Review (and Parameters) the percent of balanced leadership articles was greater than or equal to the managerial leadership articles. However, on the aggregate, traditional leadership articles and managerial articles represent 85% of the total data. Therefore, to better illustrate the relationship between traditional leadership and managerial leadership advocacy, both balanced and neutral leadership data have been omitted from figures 1 through 6.

Parameters

Table 2 provides the data from the content analysis of Parameters. Both 1973 and 1976 are statistically distorted in that only one issue of Parameters was published during those years. There were 415 leadership articles contained within the journal during the period of analysis, of which 9.2% dealt with leadership. Of the leadership articles, 57.9% were categorized as traditional leadership and 18.4% as managerial leadership in focus. The remainder of the articles were either balanced (18.4%) or neutral (5.3%) in leadership orientation.

Figure 2 displays the results of the content analysis of leadership articles for Parameters.

Table 1

Military Review Content Analysis

Year	<u>n</u>	X	X/ <u>n</u>	T	T/X	M	M/X	B	B/X	N	N/X
1970	141	5	3.5%	3	60%	0	0%	2	40%	0	0%
1971	135	12	8.9%	8	67%	2	16%	2	17%	1	8%
1972	124	6	4.8%	2	33%	0	0%	3	50%	1	17%
1973	113	10	8.8%	3	30%	5	50%	1	10%	1	10%
1974	119	3	2.5%	1	33%	2	67%	0	0%	0	0%
1975	120	1	0.8%	1	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
1976	117	3	2.6%	3	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
1977	111	2	1.8%	0	0%	1	50%	1	50%	0	0%
1978	100	8	8.0%	2	25%	5	63%	0	0%	1	13%
1979	104	9	8.7%	8	89%	0	0%	1	11%	0	0%
1980	108	32	29.6%	25	78%	2	6%	3	9%	2	6%
1981	103	4	3.9%	4	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
1982	87	8	9.2%	6	75%	0	0%	2	25%	0	0%
1983	77	8	10.4	7	88%	0	0%	1	12%	0	0%
1984	74	4	5.4%	2	50%	0	0%	2	50%	0	0%
1985	87	15	17.2%	13	87%	0	0%	2	13%	0	0%
TOTAL	1579	130	8.2%	88	68%	17	14%	20	15%	5	4%

n = total number of articles in each year

X = of n total number of leadership articles

X/n = Percent of articles that were leadership articles

T = Traditional leadership articles

T/X = Percent of leadership articles that were Traditional leadership

M = Managerial leadership articles

M/X = Percent of leadership articles that were Managerial leadership

B = Balanced leadership articles

B/X = Percent of leadership articles that were Balanced leadership

N = Neutral leadership articles

N/X = Percent of leadership articles that were neutral leadership

Figure 1. Military Review: Comparison of percent of leadership articles advocating Traditional leadership and Managerial leadership, by year, 1970 to 1985.




Table 2

Parameters Content Analysis

Year	<u>n</u>	X	X/ <u>n</u>	T	T/X	M	M/X	B	B/X	N	N/X
1971	20	2	10.0%	1	50%	1	50%	0	0%	0	0%
1972	12	1	8.3%	0	0%	0	0%	1	100%	0	0%
1973	6	1	1.7%	0	0%	1	100%	0	0%	0	0%
1974	13	3	2.3%	0	0%	1	33%	2	67%	0	0%
1975	14	0	0.0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
1976	8	0	0.0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
1977	35	2	5.7%	1	50%	1	50%	0	0%	0	0%
1978	33	6	18.2%	3	50%	2	33%	1	17%	0	0%
1979	37	6	16.2%	2	33%	0	0%	2	33%	2	33%
1980	46	6	13.0%	4	67%	1	17%	1	17%	0	0%
1981	45	3	7.0%	3	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
1982	36	3	8.3%	3	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
1983	37	1	3.0%	1	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
1984	36	1	3.0%	1	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
1985	37	3	8.1%	3	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
TOTAL	415	38	9.2%	22	58%	7	18%	7	18%	2	5%

n = total number of articles in each year

X = of n total number of leadership articles

X/n = Percent of articles that were leadership articles

T = Traditional leadership articles

T/X = Percent of leadership articles that were Traditional leadership

M = Managerial leadership articles

M/X = Percent of leadership articles that were Managerial leadership


B = Balanced leadership articles

B/X = Percent of leadership articles that were Balanced leadership

N = Neutral leadership articles

N/X = Percent of leadership articles that were neutral leadership

Figure 2. Parameters: Comparison of percent of leadership articles advocating Traditional leadership and Managerial leadership, by year, 1971 to 1985.



Infantry

Table 3 provides the data from the content analysis of Infantry. Of the 924 articles contained within the journal, 11.6% focused on leadership. Of the leadership articles, 72.0% were categorized as traditional leadership and 15.0% as managerial leadership in orientation. The remainder of the articles were either balanced (7.5%), or neutral (5.6%) in nature.

Figure 3 portrays the results of the content analysis of leadership articles for Infantry.

A LOG

Table 4 shows the data from the content analysis of A LOG. Of the 1099 articles published within the journal, 5.7% dealt with leadership topics. Of the leadership articles, 30.2% were categorized as traditional leadership and 50.8% as managerial leadership in focus. The remainder of the articles were balanced (19.0%). The researcher categorized none of the articles as neutral.

Figure 4 displays the results of the content analysis of leadership articles for A LOG.

Table 3

Infantry Content Analysis

Year	<u>n</u>	X	X/ <u>n</u>	T	T/X	M	M/X	B	B/X	N	N/X
1970	63	8	12.7%	8	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
1971	81	8	9.9%	6	75%	2	25%	0	0%	0	0%
1972	80	13	16.3%	8	62%	4	31%	1	7%	0	0%
1973	64	5	7.8%	2	40%	1	20%	0	0%	2	40%
1974	59	7	11.9%	5	71%	1	14%	0	0%	1	14%
1975	52	8	15.4%	2	25%	1	13%	3	37%	2	25%
1976	51	4	7.8%	4	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
1977	59	4	6.8%	0	0%	3	75%	1	25%	0	0%
1978	54	6	11.1%	6	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
1979	55	6	10.9%	5	83%	1	17%	0	0%	0	0%
1980	52	3	5.8%	2	67%	1	33%	0	0%	0	0%
1981	51	2	3.9%	2	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
1982	58	11	19.0%	9	82%	1	9%	0	0%	1	9%
1983	53	7	13.2%	7	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
1984	48	8	16.7%	7	88%	0	0%	1	12%	0	0%
1985	44	7	15.9%	4	57%	1	14%	2	29%	0	0%
TOTAL	924	107	11.6%	77	72%	16	15%	8	8%	6	5%

n = total number of articles in each year

X = of n total number of leadership articles

X/n = Percent of articles that were leadership articles

T = Traditional leadership articles

T/X = Percent of leadership articles that were Traditional leadership

M = Managerial leadership articles

M/X = Percent of leadership articles that were Managerial leadership

B = Balanced leadership articles

B/X = Percent of leadership articles that were Balanced leadership

N = Neutral leadership articles

N/X = Percent of leadership articles that were neutral leadership

Figure 3. Infantry: Comparison of percent of leadership articles advocating Traditional leadership and Managerial leadership, by year, 1970 to 1985.




Table 4

A LOG Content Analysis

Year	<u>n</u>	X	X/ <u>n</u>	T	T/X	M	M/X	B	B/X	N	N/X
1970	38	4	10.5%	1	25%	3	75%	0	0%	0	0%
1971	61	8	13.1%	0	0%	8	100%	0	0%	0	0%
1972	62	7	11.3%	1	14%	6	86%	0	0%	0	0%
1973	63	2	3.2%	0	0%	2	100%	0	0%	0	0%
1974	73	6	8.2%	2	33%	3	50%	1	17%	0	0%
1975	75	4	5.3%	0	0%	2	50%	2	50%	0	0%
1976	75	3	4.0%	1	33%	1	33%	1	33%	0	0%
1977	74	4	5.4%	1	25%	1	25%	2	50%	0	0%
1978	71	2	2.8%	1	50%	0	0%	1	50%	0	0%
1979	75	4	5.3%	1	25%	2	50%	1	25%	0	0%
1980	70	2	2.9%	0	0%	2	100%	0	0%	0	0%
1981	77	2	2.6%	2	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
1982	81	4	4.9%	2	50%	1	25%	1	25%	0	0%
1983	54	3	5.6%	2	67%	0	0%	1	33%	0	0%
1984	83	2	2.4%	1	50%	0	0%	1	50%	0	0%
1985	67	6	9.0%	4	67%	1	17%	1	17%	0	0%
TOTAL	1099	63	5.7%	19	30%	32	51%	12	19%	0	0%

n = total number of articles in each year

X = of n total number of leadership articles

X/n = Percent of articles that were leadership articles

T = Traditional leadership articles

T/X = Percent of leadership articles that were Traditional leadership

M = Managerial leadership articles

M/X = Percent of leadership articles that were Managerial leadership


B = Balanced leadership articles

B/X = Percent of leadership articles that were Balanced leadership

N = Neutral leadership articles

N/X = Percent of leadership articles that were neutral leadership

Figure 4. **A LOG:** Comparison of percent of leadership articles advocating Traditional leadership and Managerial leadership, by year, 1970 to 1985.



Armed Forces Journal

Table 5 provides the data of the content analysis of Armed Forces Journal. There were 3693 articles published within the journal, of which 2.5% were articles that dealt with leadership. Of the leadership articles, 66% were categorized as traditional leadership and 27.7% as managerial leadership. The remainder of the articles were balanced (6.4%). The researcher categorized none of the articles as neutral.

Figure 5 displays the results of the content analysis of leadership for Armed Forces Journal.

Aggregate

Table 6 provides the data of the content analysis of the aggregate of the five selected journals. There were 8543 articles published by the five journals, of which 5.1% were articles that dealt with leadership. Of the leadership articles, 62% were categorized as traditional leadership and 23% as managerial leadership. The remainder of the articles were either balanced (12%) or neutral (3%).

Figure 6 displays the results of the content analysis of leadership for the aggregate of the five journals.

Table 5

Armed Forces Journal Content Analysis

Year	<u>n</u>	X	X/ <u>n</u>	T	T/X	M	M/X	B	B/X	N	N/X
1970	692	10	1.4%	3	30%	7	70%	0	0%	0	0%
1971	403	6	1.5%	3	50%	3	50%	0	0%	0	0%
1972	266	12	4.5%	6	50%	5	42%	1	8%	0	0%
1973	221	6	2.7%	4	67%	1	17%	1	17%	0	0%
1974	185	4	2.2%	2	50%	2	50%	0	0%	0	0%
1975	199	1	1.0%	2	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
1976	168	2	1.2%	2	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
1977	234	4	1.7%	3	75%	1	25%	0	0%	0	0%
1978	198	5	2.5%	4	80%	1	20%	0	0%	0	0%
1979	221	4	1.8%	3	75%	1	25%	0	0%	0	0%
1980	298	7	2.3%	6	86%	1	14%	0	0%	0	0%
1981	268	3	1.1%	2	67%	0	0%	1	33%	0	0%
1982	281	6	2.9%	5	83%	1	17%	0	0%	0	0%
1983	250	5	2.0%	3	60%	2	40%	0	0%	0	0%
1984	226	9	4.0%	6	67%	1	11%	2	22%	0	0%
1985	275	9	3.3%	8	89%	0	0%	1	11%	0	0%
TOTAL	3693	94	2.5%	62	66%	26	28%	6	6%	0	0%

n = total number of articles in each year

X = of n total number of leadership articles

X/n = Percent of articles that were leadership articles

T = Traditional leadership articles

T/X = Percent of leadership articles that were Traditional leadership

M = Managerial leadership articles

M/X = Percent of leadership articles that were Managerial leadership

B = Balanced leadership articles

B/X = Percent of leadership articles that were Balanced leadership

N = Neutral leadership articles

N/X = Percent of leadership articles that were neutral leadership

Figure 5. Armed Forces Journal: Comparison of percent of leadership articles advocating Traditional leadership and Managerial leadership, by year, 1970 to 1985.




Table 6

Journal Aggregate Content Analysis

Year	<u>n</u>	X	X/ <u>n</u>	T	T/X	M	M/X	B	B/X	N	N/X
1970	934	27	2.9%	15	56%	10	37%	2	7%	0	0%
1971	700	36	5.1%	18	50%	16	44%	2	6%	0	0%
1972	544	39	7.2%	17	44%	15	38%	6	15%	1	3%
1973	467	24	5.1%	9	38%	10	42%	2	8%	3	13%
1974	449	23	5.1%	10	44%	9	39%	3	13%	1	4%
1975	460	15	3.3%	5	33%	3	20%	5	33%	2	13%
1976	419	12	2.9%	10	83%	1	8%	1	8%	0	0%
1977	513	16	3.1%	5	31%	7	44%	4	25%	0	0%
1978	456	27	5.9%	16	59%	8	30%	2	8%	1	4%
1979	492	29	5.9%	19	66%	4	14%	4	14%	2	7%
1980	574	50	8.7%	37	74%	7	14%	4	8%	2	4%
1981	544	14	2.6%	13	93%	0	0%	1	7%	0	0%
1982	543	32	5.9%	25	78%	3	9%	3	9%	1	3%
1983	471	24	5.1%	20	83%	2	8%	2	8%	0	0%
1984	467	24	5.1%	17	71%	1	4%	6	25%	0	0%
1985	510	40	7.8%	32	80%	2	5%	6	15%	0	0%
TOTAL	8543	432	5.1%	268	62%	98	23%	53	12%	13	3%

n = total number of articles in each year

X = of n total number of leadership articles

X/n = Percent of articles that were leadership articles

T = Traditional leadership articles

T/X = Percent of leadership articles that were Traditional leadership

M = Managerial leadership articles

M/X = Percent of leadership articles that were Managerial leadership


B = Balanced leadership articles

B/X = Percent of leadership articles that were Balanced leadership

N = Neutral leadership articles

N/X = Percent of leadership articles that were neutral leadership

Figure 6. Aggregate comparison of percent of leadership articles advocating Traditional leadership and Managerial leadership, by year, 1970 to 1985.



Trends

The investigator observed two interrelated trends in military leadership from the articles published in selected military journals between 1970 and 1985. The first trend involved the development and evolving manner of the leadership styles: traditional, managerial, balanced and neutral. The second trend included the variation in percentage of leadership articles, within the five journals, during the different segments of time.

Leadership Advocacy

Military Review and Infantry exhibited the closest correlation in the data derived from the content analysis of the five journals. (See Figures 1 and 3.) The journals demonstrated a decreasing trend in the number of traditional leadership articles from 1970 to 1974. There was a significant increase in traditional leadership articles in 1976. In addition to Military Review and Infantry, Armed Forces Journal also manifested a dramatic increase in traditional leadership articles during 1976. This increase in the data was followed in all three journals in 1977 by a concomitant decline in traditional leadership articles and an increase in managerial leadership articles. The trend in the later years revealed an increase of traditional leadership articles and a decrease of managerial

leadership articles.

The trends found in A LOG differed from trends observed in the previous three journals in the following areas. First, A LOG is orientated toward the management of resources. Secondly, for the first 10 years of the study period, from 1970 to 1980, A LOG's managerial leadership articles obscured the traditional leadership articles. (See Figure 4). The dramatic increase in the 1978 data is suspect because during that year only two leadership articles were published in A LOG. One of the published articles advocated traditional leadership, and the other advocated balanced leadership. During the last five years of the study, from 1981-1985, traditional leadership articles were more prevalent than managerial leadership articles.

The results of the content analysis from Parameters were erratic. The analysis indicated an absence of traditional leadership articles in the earlier years of the study, and the appearance and subsequent increase in traditional leadership articles during the later years. An analysis of the total number of leadership articles published in Parameters during the study years yielded data that cannot be conclusive. During eight of the years, there were two or less leadership articles from which to conduct the content analysis. Furthermore, in 1973 and 1976, only one issue of Parameters was published. In 1975 and 1976, there were

no leadership articles published within the journal. Finally, among the journals analyzed, Parameters had the highest incidence of balanced leadership and neutral leadership articles, 18.4% and 5.3%, respectively.

Appearance of Leadership Articles

The content analysis revealed that although all of the journals included published leadership articles, the annual percentage of their appearance varied considerably. Infantry consistently carried the highest percentage of leadership articles. The leadership articles published for the years analyzed ranged from a low of 3.9% in 1981 to a high of 19% in 1982. The journal's orientation toward the junior officer and the non-commissioned officer could account for the higher percentage of leadership articles published. The articles published focused on the foundational aspects of leadership development for the junior officer and the non-commissioned officer. During the earlier years of the study period, there was a higher percentage of leadership articles in Infantry. The higher percentage was attributable, in part, to the Viet Nam emphasis on "how to" combat leadership articles.

Conversely, Armed Forces Journal had the lowest percentage of articles on leadership. Armed Forces Journal covers a wide range of topics with a readership focused more on the senior levels of the defense establishment. Many of

the Armed Forces Journal's articles were briefer than those published in the other journals, sometimes consisting of one or two paragraphs. The brevity of the articles resulted in a significantly greater article count than in the other journals. (See Table 5.)

There was a significant increase in the publication of leadership articles within the journals during 1985. The Army's annual theme in 1985 was "The Year of Army Leadership." Correspondingly, four of the five journals analyzed, with Infantry as the exception, increased their leadership coverage during 1985. As previously noted, Infantry consistently published a multitude of leadership articles because of its target audience.

Limitations

The investigator was limited in the analysis of the data in the following areas. First, the content analysis of the articles was limited to those articles actually published in the journals. The researcher was not able to ascertain the number and type of articles submitted for publication during any of the study years. None of the journals considered maintain such information. The importance of this limitation was that the leadership articles that were printed might not reflect all of the leadership articles submitted for publication during the

timeframe. There could have been several leadership articles submitted for publication, with the editor or journal staff selecting the articles suitable for publication. For example, in 1977 Parameters published two articles that were categorized by the investigator as leadership articles. The two articles were further categorized as one advocating traditional leadership and the other advocating managerial leadership. The researcher was not able to ascertain if those were the only two articles submitted; or if there were more of one type submitted (i.e. 10 Traditional and 2 Managerial) but only one of each was published.

Secondly, the investigator was limited by his inability to ascertain the editorial philosophy of the journals selected for the study. While the journal philosophy is clearly stated in the respective journals, it is the editor who makes the final decision regarding article selection for publication. The degree to which the editor is influenced by his personal beliefs or values or, in the case of the four military sponsored journals, by the Department of Defense or Department of the Army, is unknown. Two journals, A LOG and the Armed Forces Journal, retained the same editorial leadership from 1970 to 1985. Although those two journals retained one editor during the interim of the study period, it could not be surmised that their editorial prerogative in selecting articles remained

unchanged.

The remainder of the journals analyzed did experience changes in editorial leadership during the study period. There was only one incidence where an editor served on two of the journals during the period of analysis. Edward M. Bradford served as the editor of Infantry from May/June, 1971 to July/August, 1973, and as the editor of Parameters from September, 1977 to June, 1980. During the years which Bradford served as editor of those journals, no significant correlation between the quantity or type of leadership articles published could be formulated.

The final limitation is in the role of author advocacy in preparation of articles for publication. Those authors who are inclined to write and submit articles on leadership issues may not reflect the general consensus of the Army on the subject of leadership. Military journals have traditionally served as a forum for officers to explain, expound, or repudiate military plans, policies, procedures, doctrine, equipment, and strategy (Gates, 1985, p.429). The investigator can only draw inferences about leadership and/or changes in leadership based on the articles published during the study period.

CHAPTER FIVE

Let us study man in battle, for it is he who really fights (du Picq, 1903/1946 p.41).

Explanation

The researcher analyzed the data attempting to explain the change in leadership philosophy as advocated in the selected journals. The investigator analyzed the content analysis in shorter segments of time. The time periods utilized correspond to the trends observed by the investigator in the data analysis conducted in the previous chapter and significant events which may explain the shift in leadership advocacy experienced during the period of the study. The purpose of this analysis was to address the following research question.

How could any change in leadership philosophy, as advocated in selected journals, be explained?

1970 - 1972

The researcher choose the time frame 1970 to 1972 because 1972 signaled the wind down of the United States involvement in the Viet Nam conflict, and the following year, 1973, ushered in the era of the Volunteer Army (VOLAR). The researcher discovered that during the earliest years, 1970

to 1972, the data revealed a decrease in the number of traditional leadership articles published. Writers advocated a more traditional leadership style in their articles 49.7% of the time during this period. Forty percent of the writers advocated a managerial style of leadership. The majority of the articles were oriented toward the war in Viet Nam. The leadership articles in both Military Review and Infantry dealt with the junior leader in combat. Conversely, 84% of A LOG writers advocated managerial leadership.

Several key external factors affected the military forces and the U.S. Army during this time period. In February of 1970 the Gates Commission released its report recommending that an all volunteer Army be established and that only a standby draft be authorized. Moskos cites the impact of the Gates Commission:

Instead of a military system anchored in the normative values of a calling - captured in words like "Duty," "Honor," "Country" - the Gates Commission explicitly argued that primary reliance in recruiting an armed force should be on monetary inducements guided by marketplace standards (1974, p. 4).

In concurrence with the Gates recommendation, the Congress mandated the establishment of the all volunteer army and set February 1973 for the suspension of the draft.

In 1971 the military services increased the salaries of service members in an effort to make military compensa-

tion competitive with civilian rates. Moskos (1977) contended that the attempt to develop comparable military-civilian remuneration instituted "an employer-employee relationship, quite at variance with military tradition" (1977, p. 3). The pay raise, and other reforms inaugurated by the military, endeavored to accommodate the civilian youth values. The Army's recruiting slogan "Today's Army Wants to Join You" and greater liberalism in hair length, abolition of reveille, reduction of personal inspections and greater privacy in the barracks signaled a change in Army life and leadership. Finally, the first serious likelihood of military unionization was demonstrated. Moskos argued that the possibility of military trade unions and the increasing reliance on contract civilians to perform military tasks, derived from an occupational model (1974, p. 5). The Army's preparations for VOLAR, the acronym for volunteer army and the end of the draft, were of significant impact on the leadership philosophy of the Army during this period.

1973 - 1976

There was a shift in both the thrust of the writers' emphases and the quantity of leadership articles during the 1973-1976 timeframe. The year 1976 is significant as an end date because the following year President Carter began his term as President. Additionally, 1976 indicated a unique rise in the percentage of traditional leadership articles.

During 1973 and 1974 both traditional and managerial leadership emphases were similar. In 1973, 37.5% of the authors advocated traditional leadership, while 41.7% advocated managerial leadership. In 1974, the trend reversed so that 43.5% of the authors advocated traditional leadership and 39.1% advocated managerial leadership. The most dramatic rise in the percentage of traditional leadership articles occurred in 1976. In 1975, 33.3% of the writers supported the traditional leader model, while in 1976 the number of authors supporting traditional leadership increased to 83.3%. It is significant to note that 1976 was the nadir of a downward trend, begun in 1972, in percentage of articles published on leadership. The 2.9% in traditional leadership articles represented the second lowest percentage of leadership articles demonstrated during the analysis period.

Several internal and external factors could have impacted on the advocacy of the writers. First, the newest edition of Military Leadership (FM 22-100) was published in June of 1973. This edition placed leadership as a co-equal with management and implied that leadership was a subset of management. The radical change in the approved Army leadership doctrine was promulgated throughout the training literature and brought about a shift in the method of teaching leadership within the Army's educational system. O'Meara described the shift as follows.

Imperceptibly, to most observers, the Army moved from an Army directed by leaders to an Army directed by managers. The change reflects the shift toward modern management practices that has transformed and now characterizes modern society (1975, p. 15).

This edition, with its emphasis on management, created a rise in antithetical advocacy articles.

This time period was overshadowed by a crisis at the highest level of government. What started as a seemingly routine burglary at the Watergate Hotel in Washington D.C., culminated in the resignation of the President of the United States on 9 August 1974. The highest levels of leadership came under criticism during this period for failure to demonstrate the ethical and value-based leadership required of those positions in which we place our special trust and confidence.

On 12 May 1975 the United States cargo ship Mayaguez was captured off the Cambodian coast. The resultant rescue of the Mayaguez and her crew was marred by the loss of 41 service members. Ryan (1985) cites the desire of Washington leaders to manage the military operation, conducted halfway around the world via telephonic communication, as indicative of the managerial ethos that had pervaded our senior military and civilian leaders. Record (1984) criticized the military for its "unbridled - though historically unwarranted - faith in technology as the solution to most problems on the battlefield" (p. D4). The emphasis on

efficiency with little regard for effectiveness could account for the rise in advocacy of traditional leadership articles.

The West Point cheating scandal in 1976 resulted in a serious examination of the integrity of cadets at the Military Academy. The investigation and attendant revisions, and an increased academic emphasis on general ethics, produced a reaffirmation of the academy's role as the educator of potential Army officers (Smith, 1980, pp. 8-9). The preceding developments had a potentially significant impact leading to increased emphasis on traditional leadership in published articles.

1977 - 1980

The years 1977 through 1980 were analyzed because they reflect the Carter Presidency. There was a decline of traditional leadership articles in 1977 to the lowest percentage in the study, 31.3%. Additionally, 1977 manifested the lowest percentage of leadership articles, 3.3%. The remainder of the period revealed an increase in both the number of leadership articles and the percentage that were traditional leadership articles.

The period contained several key events that could explain the rise of traditional leadership articles. President Carter took office in January 1977. Among his

appointees were Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense and Clifford L. Alexander, Secretary of the Army, both of whom served under President Carter for the full four-year term. The Carter administration elected to reduce the size of the defense budget. Included in the reduction of the defense budget was the proposal to remove a significant portion of our combat forces from Korea. Not until an Army general put his career on the line, by voicing his objections, did President Carter relent in the proposed withdrawal. This act of moral courage by General Singlaub cost him his career, but he demonstrated the traditional leadership traits of candor, courage and commitment.

On 4 November 1979, Iranian militants seized the United States Embassy in Teheran. The hostages remained in captivity for 444 days. The frustrations of the hostage situation were exacerbated by the failure of an Iranian rescue mission on 24 April, 1980. Probably no other military operation incurred such castigation on the military leadership as did the aborted mission in the Iranian desert. The military was accused in the press and in public inquiries of ineffective leadership and planning in the conduct of the mission. The external criticism and internal analysis of the missions and roles of the military in the Iranian rescue mission failure may have resulted in a significant increase in traditional leadership advocacy.

Finally, one of the most significant events was the appointment, on 22 July 1979, of a new Army Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer. General Meyer's tenure would mark a "watershed" period for traditional leadership emphasis. His article, "Leadership: A Return to Basics," in the July 1980 Military Review, served as the catalyst for the renewed focus on traditional leadership advocacy.

1981 - 1983

The selection of the years 1981 through 1983 was predicated upon two factors. First, it marked, concurrently, the beginning of President Reagan's term of office and the freeing of the Iranian hostages. Secondly, 1983 was significant militarily because of the Beirut bombing and the invasion of Grenada. During 1981 to 1983 the largest percentage of traditional leadership articles were published. In 1981 there was the highest percentage of published traditional leadership articles, 92.9%, but the lowest percentage of published leadership articles, 2.6%. The remainder of the time period manifested an increase both in percentage of leadership articles published and in percentage of traditional leadership articles published. General Meyer's influence on this period cannot be underestimated. His efforts to renew the emphasis on traditional leadership "basics" was evident in not only the attendant rise in the percentage of traditional leadership articles in all the journals analyzed, but concomitantly in the

decrease of managerial leadership articles.

Another key factor in the shift in advocacy toward traditional leadership was the publication of the current edition of Military Leadership, (FM 22-100), October, 1983. This edition stressed the interpersonal skills of a leader. It advocated the BE (beliefs, values, and character), KNOW (knowledge based on experience and training), and DO (capability of accomplishment through skills) of leadership (p. 45). Management as a philosophy was not discussed in the new FM 22-100.

While the press argued that the military was "full of bureaucrats instead of warriors" (Record, 1984), the new President of the United States, Ronald W. Reagan, exhibited a strong commitment to the military. Under Reagan's leadership the military received increased funding, increased responsibility, and more, importantly, increased respect and authority from the civilian leadership. Ryan (1985) contended that under the Reagan administration, the Chiefs of Staff were restored as direct military advisors to the president.

From the Kennedy administration in 1960 through the Carter years, the Chiefs's [sic] legal role as military advisors to the commander-in-chief became one in name only because the respective presidents, by choice, saw the Chiefs only at infrequent, general meetings and not in private consultation. Once again, after a twenty-year hiatus, the president [Reagan] consulted face to face with the nation's most competent military minds (Ryan, 1985, p. 137).

However, in 1983, there occurred both military disaster and victory. On 23 October, 1983, a suicidal terrorist driver drove a truck into the Marine headquarters building in Beirut, Lebanon. The subsequent explosion leveled the building and killed 241 Marines. The military leadership was criticized for its lack of understanding of the terrorist threat in the area and failure to exercise its inherent leadership responsibility in adequately protecting the Marine force ashore. Had not President Reagan preempted the military system, by taking responsibility for the deaths of the Marines, many in the chain of command would have been relieved from duty. Two days later, U.S. forces landed on the Caribbean island of Grenada. The military operation was a success, but it was not without operational flaws. The success was at the lower, tactical levels, where the junior leaders performed in a superb manner. The higher operational and joint service level was flawed by interservice bureaucracy. These key events, one positive and the other negative, could have impacted on the increase in leadership articles, in general, and in traditional leadership articles, in particular.

1984 - 1985

This period continued the trend of increased traditional leadership focus. The investigator discovered the

highest number of leadership articles for all the study years during 1985. The increased emphasis on traditional leadership was largely attributable to the 1985 theme of the Army, the "Year of Army Leadership."

The two studies analyzed in Chapter Two are unique in their methodology. Zais (1986) suggested that the study of leadership in the 1960s and 1970s focused on behavioral and managerial science. The Officer Personnel Management System study, (OPMS) conducted in October of 1984, was tasked to study combat leadership, in addition to personnel management aspects. The OPMS study group went not to the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the U.S. Military Academy, but to the Department of History for an historic, as opposed to a scientific, appraisal of leadership in combat (Zais, p.55). This approach was significant in that the deviation from a scientific analysis of leadership resulted in an increased emphasis on the historically traditional leader.

The Professional Development of Officers Study, (PDOS), focused on the officer corps and its value to the nation, which is defined by combat. PDOS concluded that the officer corps of the future must develop and master the art and science of war and possess "warrior spirit," and demonstrate professionalism. The PDOS survey, sent to 23,000 randomly selected officers, in all grades (O1 - O6), demonstrated that the concerns were not abstract opinions. Of the

14,000 respondents, when questioned on the percent of officers, at their grade, that would make good wartime leaders, the median response selected was "only about 50% would make good wartime leaders" (PDOS, 1985, p. JJ-2-A-18). Seventy-eight percent felt that there is not enough emphasis on war/combat, and forty-eight percent felt that the bold creative officer cannot survive in today's Army (PDOS, 1985, JJ-2-A-27).


In a second survey sent to all active duty general officers, when queried on the percentage of their peers who would make good wartime leaders, the median response was "about two-thirds." Forty-seven percent of the generals felt that "Army leaders at senior levels behave too much like corporate executives and not enough like warriors" (PDOS, 1985, JJ-5-A-5).

Framework for Comparison

In concluding the explanation, a model was constructed to serve as a framework for data comparison. The model was structured on a shift in leadership focus, manifested in the United States Army's leadership manual, Military Leadership, (FM 22-100). The editions of FM 22-100, 1951 through 1983, were categorized with respect to emphasis of traditional leadership, as High, Medium, or Low. This categorization was predicated on a subjective assessment of


the editions' of the manual to determine the degree of managerial leadership influence. In the earlier editions of FM 22-100, the emphasis of leadership is traditional. However, in the 1961 and 1965 editions, there is a subtle shift towards managerial leadership, as manifested by the inclusion of management in the operational definitions of leadership. The Army's leadership focus shifted from a traditional form of leadership ("the art of influencing men...to complete the mission") (FM 22-100, 1958, p.7), to the implication in the 1973 edition, that leadership (traditional) was a subset of management (p.1-3). The trend shifted in 1983 when the manual omitted any reference to management, and concentrated on the application of beliefs, values, skills, and ethics; and the BE, KNOW, and DO of (traditional) leadership. The model shown in Figure 7 indicates the shift in emphasis between traditional leadership and managerial leadership from the 1951 leadership manual to the 1983 manual. Figure 8, delineates the leadership model for the period of analysis of the study. Figure 9, compares the traditional leadership results with the leadership model constructed by the investigator.

Figure 7. FM 22-100 Leadership Model: Trends of emphasis on Traditional leadership as reflected in editions of FM 22-100, Military Leadership, by year, 1951 to 1983.




□ FM 22-100 EDITIONS, BY YEAR

Figure 8. FM 22-100 Leadership Model: Trends of emphasis on Traditional leadership as reflected in editions of FM 22-100, Military Leadership, by year, 1970 to 1985.



□ FM 22-100 EDITIONS, BY YEAR

Figure 9. FM 22-100 Leadership Model: Comparison of adjusted aggregate content analysis data, for Traditional leadership, and FM 22-100 Leadership Model, by year, 1970 to 1985.



CHAPTER SIX

A leader is best
When people barely know that he exists,
Not so good when people obey and acclaim him,
Worst when they despise him.
"Fail to honor people,
They fail to honor you;"
But of a good leader, who talks little,
When his work is done, his aim fulfilled,
They will all say, "We did this ourselves."
--Lao Tzu, Sixth Century B.C.:
Verse 17 of the Tao Teh Ching
(Wakin, 1984, p. 49)

Conclusions

The findings of the research suggest support for several conclusions regarding the focus of leadership literature contained in selected military journals during the period between 1970 to 1985. The first is that there has been a shift in advocacy of the articles during the years 1970 to 1985. The articles published during 1970 to 1973 showed a focus towards the traditional leadership style. During the mid 1970's the advocacy of the articles shifted towards managerial leadership. Finally during 1981 to 1985 the advocacy of the articles took a dramatic turn towards traditional leadership.

A second conclusion is that the trends demonstrated by the analysis are a result of both internal and external

influences on the Army and the manifestation in changes in leadership philosophy. The ability of the Army, or any military organization, to remain immune to the effects of society upon it is limited. Therefore, the dichotomy that the military faces is the realization that it must draw its leaders from and operate within society and yet demonstrate the ability to establish a line of demarcation between its role in serving society and that of professional military imperatives.

The professional leadership imperatives military leaders must stress are more than managerial efficiency, but must transcend to the leadership that has as its benchmark: values of sacrifice, loyalty, and commitment to the nation and the organization. The Army Chief of Staff, General Meyer, stated this concern when he called for a "renaissance in the art of military leadership" in 1980 (p.5). His article was considered, and likely prompted, one of the major turning points in the advocacy of traditional leadership that was evident in the research. The military found itself caught up in a rapidly changing society, where systems and models took over for inadequacy in basic leadership qualities. We became fixated on the premise that the "Department of Defense could and should operate as effectively and efficiently as private enterprise" (p.6). "The old normative criteria of leadership, which [were] not convincing to congressional investigators or to the civilian

secretaries imported from the business community, [were] unconsciously avoided as being somehow unscientific and unequal to the challenges of today's Army" (O'Meara, 1975, p.15).

In the mid-1970s the fixation was demonstrated by the shift in advocacy of leadership towards the more managerial styles. O'Meara stated that during the Viet Nam conflict "we were beautifully managed and inadequately led. We were Mr. McNamara's Army, materially the richest and spiritually one of the poorest that ever took to the field" (1975, p. 17).

The Army's doctrinal base for leadership is reflected in several sources, however, Field Manual 22-100, Military Leadership, is the cornerstone. The manual evolved during the period 1970 to 1985, from a managerial leadership emphasis toward a more traditional leadership emphasis. It will be argued by many that the philosophical underpinnings of both the 1973 edition and the 1983 edition were similar, if not the same. The leadership versus management issue can be debated as merely an issue of semantics, and that there is little substantive difference between "leadership" and "management." However, Baucom (1985) contended that "the linguistics difficulties may be the key to the underlying issue that fuels the debate" (p. 5). He states that words not only denote things, but also carry connotations to which

we respond. Janes states that "let no one think these are just word changes. Word changes are concept changes and concept changes are behavioral changes" (1976, p. 292). Therefore is it imperative that the Army's leadership manual deal with the subject of traditional leadership and not become embroiled in paradigms advanced by our business schools.

Recommendations

Specific policy recommendations cannot be predicated on the sample content analysis data. Advocacy of articles does not, and moreover should not, reflect complete congruence with established policy and procedures within any organization. The research can point toward the effect that shifts in leadership doctrine and policy have had on the officer corps. Future research is needed to demonstrate and clarify the interactive relationship between the roles of traditional leadership and managerial leadership within both the military and the civilian society.

As cited earlier, General Meyer held that "leadership and management are neither synonymous nor interchangeable" (1980, p.6). Both qualities are necessary for the military leader of today and the future. But management should never be confused with or replace leadership. There is required of the competent military officer a balance of the two leadership styles. The Army indeed manages a great

number of our nation's assets. But as stewards of those assets the Army should never forget that, in addition to "things," our nation turns over to us its future. The future is manifested in both the way of life we are sworn to defend and in the youth of this country that we lead.

To command, then, is to manage well when management is called for, to lead well when leadership is necessary, and to carry out orders and enforce regulations when "going by the book" is all that is required. But to confuse each of these three activities with the full scope of the command function itself is to underestimate the need for taking intellectual and moral responsibility in the performance of one's military duties (Ney, 1985, p. 29).

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